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THE CONTIvACTCLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
"No State shall *pass any law impairing the obligation of con-
tracts"-Article I, Section 10, Constitution of the United States.
ORIGIN
It is reasonably safe to assert that there is perhaps no clause
in the entire Constitution the origin and intendment of which
is subject to greater obscurity and doubt. It hs been variously
interpreted by the courts and has always given rise to the great-
est diversity of opinion among legal thinkers.
The Ordinance of 1787 passed by the Continental Congress
for the government of the Northwestern Territory makes this
provision:
"And in the just preservation of rights ana property, it Is under-
stood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force
in said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or
affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide and without fraud
previously formed."
Since this was passed by the Continental Congress while-the
Constitutional Convention was in progress its chief significance
lies in the fact that the necessity for the protection of private
contracts seems to have had the'sanction of contemporaneous
thought.
It is worthy of note, however, that a proposal by Rufus
King that the Convention sb.ould insert in the Constitution the
above provision taken from the Ordinance of 1787 was defeated
August 28, 1787 and the Rutledge substitute embracing a prohi-
bition upon the power of the States to pass "any Bill of
Attainder or ex post fact6 law" was adopted. 1 The Draft of
the C6mmittee of Five about three weeks earlier contained no
reference to the Contract Clause. Neither did the plans of Pinck-
ney, Hamilton or Paterson provide for any such restriction on
the states.
The reason for the absence of any such provision is taken
from Justice Miller:
2V. Elliot's Debates 485.
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"For the purpose of preventing any interference with contracts
the Convention had relied very largely upon the clause prohibiting the
passage of any ex post facto law."2
Dickinson, however, after consulting Blackstone, called the at-
tention of the Convention to the fact that the term "ex post
facto" related to criminal cases only. The report was passed
over to the Committee on Style before any action was taken in
regard to the matter. Rufus King, who had previously moved
the adoption of the provision from the Ordinance of 1787 as a
restriction upon the states, was a member of this committee.
Gouverneur Morris, likewise a member of the Committee, is
said to have added the words:
"No State shall pass laws 'altpring' or impairing the obligation of
contracts."
This report of the revision was submitted to the Convention on
September 12, 1787. The Convention, itself, without debate,
two days later amended the clause and put it in the form in
which it now appears in the Constitution.3
As matters stood both Congress and the states were pro-
hibited from passing Bills of Attainder and ex post facto laws,
while the states were placed under the further restriction of the
contract clause itself. It is interesting to note the following
entry in the notes of Mr. Madison:
"Mr. Gerry entered into observations inculcating the importance
of public faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States from
Impairing the obligation of contracts, alleging that Congress ought to
be laid under the like prohibitions, he made a motion to that effect.
He was not seconded."'
The foregoing facts give rise to some rather interesting con-
jectures and lead to the following inquiries:
1. If contracts were regarded by the Convention as protected by
the ex post facto clause, then was it the intention to restrict Congress
as well as the States? Evidently that was the intention since both
were denied the power to pass ex post facto laws in identical language.
If this be true then where is to be found the explanation for the change
of view that occasioned the loss of Mr. Gerry's motion for want of a
second?
2. If contracts were not regarded as protected by the ex, post
facto clause, then was there no prior intention to restrict either Con-
gress or the States? Apparently there was no such intention. This
Miller, Const. of U. S. 526.
5 Bancroft, Hist. of Const., Vol. II, book 3, chapter 11.
,'Madison Debates (Hunt and Scott) 567.
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might explain the refusal of the Convention to adopt the King pro-
posal of August 28, but would entirely fail to account for the action
in adopting the report of the Committee, embracing the Contract Clause
as a restriction upon the States, without debate.
Confusion results in the attempt to account for the action
of the Convention under either hypothesis and leaves the con-
tract clause to be interpreted as a mere matter of language
without reference to what was intended to be accomplished by
its adoption.
References to other sources for explanation are just as
unsatisfactory. The clause is only twice mentioned in the
Federalist. Mr. Hamilton makes this observation:
"Laws in violation of private contract, as they amount to aggres-
sions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them,
may be considered as another probable source of hostility. ......
We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut,
in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of
Rhode 'Island."'
We are led to infer from this that the purpose back of the
clause was to lessen the probability of hostility as between the
states growing out of contracts between their citizens. There is
not one word in regard to the inherent viciousness of state inter-
ference in private contracts that became the keynote of the early
decisions in applying the provision.
Mr. Madison, on the other hand, seems to have fixed his
gaze on future developments with prophetic vision. He wrote:
"Bills of Attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social
compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. The two former
are expressly prohibited by the declarations prefixed to some of the
State Constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the spirit ana
scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught
us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not
to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the Convention added
this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security and private
rights; and I am much deceived if they have not, in so doing, as faith-
fully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted interests of
their constituents."'
The view of Mr. Madison that retrospective legislation was
contrary to sound legislative principles seems to have been the
basis of the separate opinion of Justice Johnson in the very
early and important case of Fletcher v. Peck.- He says:
The Federalist, No. 7.
'Federalist, No. 44.
6 Cranch. 87 (1810).
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"I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the
power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle,
on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws
even on the Diety. ...... I have thrown out these ideas that I
may have it distinctly understood that my opinion on this point is not
founded on the provision in the Constitution of the United States,
relative to the laws impairing the obligation of contracts."
It is of some interest as to the early conception of the clause,
however, to note that he regards the provision as being too
equivocal to form the basis of restricting the states' power to
interfere in private contracts. He adds:
"To give it the general effect of a restriction of the state powers
in favor of private rights, is certainly going very far beyond the obvious
and necessary import of the words, and would operate to restrict the
states in the exercise of that right which every community must exer-
cise."
It is apparent that in this regard Justice Johnson lacked the
prescience of a Madison and the fatal logic of a Marshall.
Mr. Bancroft in his History of the Constitution of the
United States explains the purpose back of the contract clause
in the following statement:
"Any man loaning money or making a contract in his own State or
in another, was liable at any time to loss by some fitful act of separate
legislation. The necessity of providing effectually for the security
of private rights and the steady dispensation of justice, more, perhaps,
than anythng else, brought about the new Constitution.""
This would seem to be more nearly in harmony with the in-
terpretation of Mr. Madison but, on the other hand, a reference
to Tucker on the Constitution is more in accord with the Hamil-
tonian interpretation. He says:
"The power of this prohibition was to maintain the integrity of
contracts between citizens of different States and portions of the
Union. If any State could, at its will, impair the obligation of a con-
tract between its own citizens and citizens of other States, it would be
a fatal impediment to interstate commerce and Federal intercourse."'
These various authorities merely emphasize the extent of
the confusion that existed, and even continues to exist, as to the
real purpose back of the contract clause and the ends it was pro-
Hist. of Const. of U. S., Vol. I, book 2, c. 6.
'Tucker, Const. of U. S. 828.
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posed to accomplish. Perhaps its full significance was not real-
ized by the Convention. As was said by Mr. Cooley:
"It is remarkable that this very important clause was passed over
almost without comment during the discussions preceding the adoption
of that instrument, though since its adoption no clause which the Con-
stitution contains has been more prolific of litigation, or given rise to
more animated and at times angry controversy." 0
Obscure its origin may have been; uncertain the purpose
that brought it into being; yet, the contract clause is inseparably
connected with the early development of our constitutional
history, and in the hands of John Marshall became a vital cog
in the elaborate scheme of federal supremacy.
EARLY DEVELOPMNT
The first reference to the contract clause in the Federal
Courts is in the case of ClwmApion and Dickason v. Casey," de-
cided by Jay, Cushing and District Judge Marchant in 1792,
sitting in the Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island.
The case involved the exemption of the person from arrest and.
the estate from attachment for a period of three years under
an insolvent law designed as a protection to debtors. This law
(as applied to pre-existing debts) was held unconstitutional
as impairing the obligation of contracts.
Another very early reference to the clause in the Federal
Courts was made by Marshall, sitting in the Circuit Court for
the District of North Carolina in the case of Ogden v. Nash'
2
in 1802. A question arose as to whether a statute of limitations
of 1715 had been repealed by an act of 1789. To settle the point
the legislature of North Carolina in 1799 passed a law which
provided that the act of 1715 has continued and shall continue
in force. After holding the act of 1799 to be an invasion of the
judiciary by attempting to pass legislatively upon the legal
effect of the repealing act of 1789, Marshall added these words:
"It seems also to be void for another reason; the federal Constitu-
tion prohibits the States to pass any law Impairing the obligation of
contracts. Now will it not impair the obligation, if a contract, which,
at the time of passing the act of 1789, might be recovered on by the
creditor, shall by the operation of the act of 1799, be entirely deprived
of his remedy?"
11 Cooley, Const. Limitations, 8th Ed. 654.
"1 Warren, Sup. Ct. in U. S. Hist., Vol. 1, 67.
122 Haywood (N. C.), 227 (1802).
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The effect of the North Carolina legislation was passed upon
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Ogden
v. Blackledge'3 which was certified to the Court from the Dis-
trict Court of North Carolina, due to the difference of opinion
held by Marshall and Justice Potter. The opinion of the
Supreme Court was delivered by Cushing but the point in the
case was decided without reference to the contract clause.
The first decision of the Supreme Court holding a state law
void as being an impairment of the obligation of contract was
that of Fletcher v. Peck,14 decided in 1810. The question in the
case was whether a legislative grant was a contract that fell
within the protection of the contract clause. The history of
the case seethes with fraud and corruption among the-members
of the Georgia legislature who had granted away more than
thirty-five million acres of land for a little more than a cent an
acre. After demonstrating that the clause protects both exe-
cuted and executory contracts, Marshall continues:
"If under a fair construction of the Constitution, grants are com-
prehended under the term contracts, is a grant from the State ex-
cluded from the operation of the provis.ion? Is the clause to be con-
sidered as inhibiting the state fron impairing the obligation of con-
tracts between two individuals, but, as excluding from that inhibition
contracts made with itself? The words themselves contain no such
distinction."
Therefore the repealing grant of the Georgia Legislature was
held void as impairing the obligation of contract under the
Constitution of the United States. Reference to the separate
opinion of Justice Johnson in this case has already been made.
Two years later the Supreme Court applied the contract
clause as a limitation upon state legislation in the case of State
of New Jersey v. Wilson.15 There was involved the question as
to whether legislative tax exemption constituted a contract and
the decision was in the affirmative. Marshall cited the case of
Fletcher v. Peck (supra) as decisive of the question and with-
out hearing of argument delivered the opinion of the Court:
"The act (repealing the exemption), in the opinion of this Court,
is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, in as much as it
impairs the obligation of contract, and is, on that account, void."
Cranch, 272 (1804).
146 Cranch, 87 (1810).
7 Cranch. 164 (1812).
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Just as in these two cases the sanctity of contracts was up-
held where a state and individuals were parties, so in the case
of Sturges v. Crowinshield-O the protection was afforded to a con-
tract as between two individuals. In this case the Supreme
Court held that a New York bankrupt law was without effect to
discharge a debtor from liability for a debt contracted prior to
the passage of the law, since it would serve to impair the obli-
gation of contracts. It was accordingly decided that the dis-
charge was no defense to an action on the debt. In the course
of his opinion, Marshall said:
"The fair, and, we think, the necessary construction of the sentence
requires, that we should give these words their full and obvious mean-
ing ........ The Convention appears to have intended to establish
a general principle, that contracts should be inviolable."
Just before his opinion in the above case, however, Marshall
had delivered his opinion in the famous case of Dartmoutb Caol-
lege v. Woodward,17 holding that a corporate charter was a
contract within the constitutional provision relating to con-
tracts, and that a state legislature was without the power to im-
pair the obligation of the same.
The history of the case as stated by Mr. Bevridge s shows
that Mr. Webster and even members of the Supreme Court were
doubtful if the protection to the charter could be based upon
the contract clause. Mr Webster, in his argument of the case,
emphasized general principles of abstract justice. He quoted
Madison's statement from the Federalist (supra) declaring that
such laws interfering with contracts "are contrary to the first
principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound
legislation." A division of opinion resulted which led the Court
to continue the cause. Before rehearing, all of the Justices ex-
cept Duval and Todd had reached an agreement and Marshall
had prepared his opinion. To prevent the reopening of the case
the Chief-Justice, upon the convening of the Court at the next
term, pitched into the reading of the opinion while Mr. Pinck-
ney, who had been retained by the "University" during the
adjournment, was in the act of addressing the Court to ask for
4 Wheaton, 122 (1819).
4 Wheaton, 518 (1819).
"S Life of John Marshall, Vol..IV, 220-281.
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a reargument. 19 Despite the earlier fears of Mr. Webster and
even Justice Story as to the application of the contract clause,
Marshall, -with characteristic boldness, declared the charter to
be a contract and then proceeded to make one of the most sweep-
ing and. able arguments for contract inviolability that -was ever
pronounced. He observed:
"This is plaintly a contract to which the donors, the trustees, and
the crown, (to whose rights and obligations New Hampshire succeeds),
were the original parties. It is a contract made on a valuable con-
sideration. It is a contract for the security and disposition of prop-
erty. It is a contract, on the faith of which, real and personal estate
has been conveyed to the corporation. It is then a contract within the
letter of the Constitution, and within its spirit also, unless the fact,
that the property is invested by the donors in trustees for the promo-
tion of religion and education, for the benefit of persons who are per-
petually changing, though the objects remain the same, shall create
a particular exception, taking this case out of the prohibition contained
in the Constitution ........ On what safe and intelligible ground
can this exception stand? There is no expression in the Constitution,
no sentiment delivered by its contemporaneous expounders, which
would justify us in making it."
Thus, in the brief space of a decade, Marshall, with his
consummate skill as an analyst and logician and his passionate
devotion to stability, had taken the contract clause from its
obscure and confused origin and made it one of the most vital of
all the constitutional provisions. So well was the task performed
that succeeding generations of the judiciary have largely been
engaged in the process of restriction and limitation of the clause
in the interest of legitimate legislative discretion and control.
SUBSEQUENT LIMITATION
The first sgnificant limitation upon the provision came from
the decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,2 0 in-
volving the constitutionality of an act of the Massachusetts
Legislature of 1828, granting a charter to the defendant corpora-
tion for the erection of a free bridge in competition -with a toll
bridge operating under an unexpired charter. The case -was first
argued before the Supreme Court in 1831 but was not decided.
In 1832 it was ordered continued. Mr. Warren makes this
reference to the case:
' Life of John Marshall, Vol. IV, 261.
2 11 Peters 420 (1837).
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"It seems as the Court stood in 1832, Story, Marshall, and Thomp-
son were in favor of reversing the decree of the Massachusetts Court
(upholding the free bridge), McLean was doubtful of jurisdiction, Bald-
win dissented, and Johnson and Duval had been absent. When the
case was decided in 1837, seven judges took the contrary view, and
Story and Thompson dissented."2 '
There is evidently some error in this reference to the case
by Mr. Warren. Instead of there being seven judges taking a
a contrary view, their were only four. Story and Thompson held.
to their former view and so dissented. McLean retained his
opinion that the Court was without jurisdiction but on the merits
of the case agreed with Story and Thompson in favoring the toll
bridge. In fact, at the time of this decision in 1837, there were
only seven judges in all on the Supreme Court. The two extra
judges were not appointed until two months after the decision
and took their seats in the 1838 term. It is certain, however,
that the deaths of Marshall and Johnson, coupled with the
resignation of Duvall, had so changed the complexion of the
Court as to make the decision directly contrary to what would
have been decided by the Court as constituted in 1832. The
newly appointed Chief Justice, Taney, delivered the opinion of
the Court:
"The whole community are interested in this inquiry, and they
have a right that the power of preventing their comfort and conveni-
ence, and of advancing the public prosperity, by providing safe, con-
venient, and cheap ways for the transportation of produce, and the
purposes of travel, shall not be construed to have been surrendered or
diminished by the state; unless it shall appear in plain words, that it
was intended to be done."
Thus was established the foundation" for one of the most
far-reaching limitations upon the decision in the Dartmouth
College case that the Court has ever pronounced. Under the doc-
trine of strict construction all doubts were henceforth to be re-
solved in favor of the state and against the grantee. Mr. Web-
ster was greatly chagrined at the decision in the face of his
masterly argument before the Court. He wrote:
"The decision of the Court will have completely overturned, in my
judgment, a great provision of the Constitution."1
^1 Warren, Hist. Sup. Ct., Vol. 1II, 233, footnote.
"Warren, Sup. Ct. in U. S. Hist., Vol. H, 299.
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That there was some basis for the fears of Mr. Webster
is shown by the case of Covington v. Kentucky,23 where the
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of strict construction to a
legislative grant of tax exemption. The grant to the Water Co.
provided:
"Its property shall be and remain forever exempt from state,
county and city tax."
The Court held, however, that the grant contained no plainly
expressed intent never to amend or repeal it. Evidently the
Court was not much impressed by the use of the word "forever,"
since it decided that the implication from the grant was "for-
ever, unless the legislature should change its mind."
Another case of some interest in the application of the
doctrine of strict construction as applied to the contract clause
is that of Newton v. Conmissioners 24 decided by the Supreme
Court. An act of the legislature of Ohio in 1846 provided that
the county seat in Mahoning County should be "permanently
established" in Canfield. The terms were met and the county
seat established in Canfield. By a subsequent act of the legis-
lature it was removed. James A. Garfield argued for the city
that the subsequent legislation violated the obligation of a con-
tract. He quoted from a previous decision of the Court to
show that:
"The rule that legislative grants and contracts are to be construed
most favorably to the State does not tolerate the defeating of the grant
or contract by any hypercritical construction."
The Supreme Court decided, however, that the "county seat was
permanently established at Canfield when it was placed there
with the intention that it should remain there. It fulfilled at the
outset the entire obligation it had assumed. Keeping it there
is another and distinct thing."
Of course, the real justification for this decision rests upon
the correct and accepted theory that the establishment of county
seat is a governmental function, the free exercise of which can-
not be limited by prior grant or contract. This is still another
limitation upon the contract clause. The difficulty lies not in
the statement of the rule, but in deciding its proper application.
" 173 u. S. 231 (1899).
"1100 U. S. 548 (1879).
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Still another limitation upon the provision is the power of
eminent domain. The case of West River Bridge Co. v. Dix2 5
will best serve to illustrate this principle. In holding that a
bridge, held by an incorporated company, under an unexpired
charter from the state, may be condemned and taken as a part
of a public road, under the laws of the state. The Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Daniel, said:
"Into all contracts, whether made between States and individuals
or between individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out
of the literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by
the pre-existing and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations,
or of the community to which the parties belong; they are always pre-
sumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are
binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express
stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force. Every contract
is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as
conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their
execution shall occur. Such a condition is the right of eminent do-
main."
It is rather remarkable that while the right of eminent
domain is so readily accepted by the profession today as a
matter of course, that Mr. Webster, in his argument of this case
in 1848, could contend with all earnestness:
"This power, the eminent domain, which only within a few years
was first recognized and naturalized in this country, is unknown to our
Constitution or that of the State (Vermont). It has been adopted from
writers on other and arbitrary governments. If the Legislature or
their agents are to be the sole judges of what is to be taken, and to
what public use it is to be appointed, the most levelling ultraisms of
Anti-rentism or Agrarianism or Abolutionism may be successfully ad-
vanced."
The contract clause might stagger along with some manifes-
tation of vitality, however, were it subject only to the limita-
tions of strict construction and eminent domain. There is a
third limitation, however, that has all but stripped it of its vast
importance. This limitation is that of the police power. The
first clear-cut case coming before the Supreme Court where the
supremacy of the police power was asserted is that of Stone v.
.issisipp1. 26  The point involved was the right of Mississippi
to prohibit lotteries by constitutional provision, in the face of an
2 6 Howard 507 (1848).
2 101 U. S. 814 (1880).
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unexpired legislative charter grant to a lottery corporation,
made upon the receipt of a stipulated consideration which had
been paid. Waite delivered the opinion of the Court:
"No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public
morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their serv-
ants."
The police power of the state was flatly declared to be
paramount to the contract clause of the federal Constitution.
In line with this and similar decisions the states are now per-
mitted to engage in legislative regulations and prohibitons affect-
ing contract rights that would have unquestionably been declared
void in the early period of the Supreme Court. The vast im-
portance of the limitation lies in the ever expansive definition
that is attached to the term. Where, historically, the police
power has been regarded as embracing "health, safety and
morals," it is now given a much broader interpretation and is
made to include economic consideration. Practically every case
of justifiable legislation could be placed within the broad scope
of existing definitions.
The case of Illinois Central Railroad, Co. v. IllinoiS27 in-
volved a grant, from the state of Illinois to the railroad, of the
bed of Lake Michigan along the Chicago coast line. The
Supreme Court upheld the right of the State to repeal the grant
despite the fact that it was made upon a consideration paid by
the grantee. Evidently no question of health, safety or morals de-
termined the case. Manifestly, however, the grant was eco-
nomically unwise. Justice Field, in his opinion, said:
"We cannot it is true cite any authority where a grant of this kind
has been held invalid, for we believe that no instance exists where the
harbor of a great city and its commerce have been allowed to pass into
the control of any private corporation. But the decisions are numer-
ous which declare that such property is held by the State, by virtue of
its sovereignty, in trust for the public."
The repealing act was, therefore, upheld. It is apparent
that the invalidity of the grant was based upon the extent of
the property involved. Still, it is hard to see why this grant
presented any more evidence of invalidity than the grant in
Fletcher v. Peck (supra) invXving thirty-five million acres of
fertile lands. Economic factors now seem to outweigh the
strictures of pure logic.
146 U. S. 387 (1892).
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Still another case will serve to show the extent to which the
Supreme Court has gone in its widened conception of the police
power as being something more than a protection of the health,
safety, and morals of the public. In Aflantic Coast Lin B. 1.
Co.,v. Goldsboro28 the Court says:
"It is settled that neither the contract clause nor the due process
clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish
all regulations that are reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community; that
this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is in-
alienable even by express grant; and that all contract and property
rights are held subject to its fair exercise."
It was this, tendency of the Supreme Court to indulge in
sweeping generalizations as to the extent of the police power
that led Mr. Freund, an eminent authority in this field of the
law, to remark:
"If there is anything left to the contract clause of the Constitution
of the United States, it would take a magnifying glass to find it."
The decision of the Supreme Court in the case involving the
New York Housing law is a recent example of the modern
theory. In this case2 9 a law of New York was upheld which
directly interfered with existing contracts by allowing a tenant
to retain possession of the premises under an expired lease
which carries with it a covenant to surrender. The Court found
its justification in the post-war necessity for housing regulation
in the interest of the public welfare.
It will be interesting to note whether the Court will con-
tinue to subordinate the contract clause to an elastic and ever
expanding police power, or whether there will follow a period
of reaction that will serve to' vitalize and emphasize the pro-
vision. As matters now stand the protection of the clause goes
very little beyond the protection of the due process clause.
Since Congress is subject to this limitation also, perhaps we
have unconsciously drifted back to the apparent intent of the
Constitutional Convention to place both Congress and the states
under similar restrictions, so far as interfering with contracts is
concerned.
RAYMOND T. JoHsoN
Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
232 U. S. 548 (1914).
"256 U. S. 170 (1921).
